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Abstract
Although the relevance of property rights and transaction costs for trade and in-
novation are well-known, we still lack a formal framework to think about their origins
and interplay. Within trade interactions, fully protecting the original owners’ property
implies that some high-valuation potential buyers inefficiently refuse to buy it because
of transaction costs. When instead property rights are weak, low-valuation potential
buyers inefficiently expropriate the original owners’ property. The trade-off between
these two misallocations entails that property rights will be weaker the larger trans-
action costs are regardless of whether they are driven by frictions outside the control
of traders or determined by the mix of the dispersion in their valuation and either the
original owners’ market power or their privileged information. A similar conclusion
holds true for an upstream firm’s property rights on an input necessary to a down-
stream firm to introduce a new technology and whose cost is random and ex ante non
contractible. This time, transaction costs rise with the likelihood of a more productive
technology. All these implications survive when a group of traders/innovators has a
larger political influence on institutional design and when the disincentive to effort
effect of weak property rights is taken into account. Crucially, the model predictions
are consistent with the negative effects of proxies for market frictions and failures on
measures of the protection of personal, intellectual, and financial property for a panel
of 135 countries spanning the 2006-2015 period. Evidence from several identification
strategies suggests that these relationships are indeed causal.
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“Whenever transactions [. . .] are very expensive, [. . .] coercion is inherent [and] society will pick the
entitlement it deems favorable to the general welfare” [Calabresi and Melamed 1972, p. 1101].
“As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men,
love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce” [Smith 1976, p. 67].
1 Introduction
Albeit overwhelming evidence shows that strong property rights foster trade and innova-
tion, only recently economists have begun to study the determinants of this institution by
looking at the trade-off between the dispersed coercive power in a state of anarchy and the
predation by a central enforcement authority (Besley and Ghatak, 2010). Here, I qualify
these contributions by incorporating into the economics literature the key insight proposed by
a well-known legal scholarship (Calabresi and Melamed, 1972) and, notably, that incomplete
property rights can be efficient when transaction costs impede economic activities.
To characterize the trade-off between inefficient exclusion from trade/innovation and ex-
propriation guiding property rights selection, I study both the possibly consensual exchange
of economic value between its original owner and a potential buyer and a downstream firm’s
choice of whether to produce in-house through an old technology or to adopt a new one ne-
cessitating an upstream firm’s input. In the former case, I build on Guerriero (2016a), and I
study a society equally split into original owners, who have the same valuation for the only
good in the economy, and potential buyers, who are instead endowed with heterogeneous
valuations. The former are randomly matched to the latter by an intermediation technology
that allows each potential buyer to either obtain the good via consensual transfer by paying
the original owner’s valuation and bearing socially wasteful transaction costs or expropriate it
at no cost. I define property rights as the probability that an expropriated good is given back
to its original owner. When property is fully protected, some potential buyers with valuation
higher than that of the original owners are inefficiently excluded from trade due to transac-
tion costs. When instead the protection of property is weak, low-valuation potential buyers
inefficiently expropriate original owners. The trade-off between these two misallocations en-
tails that the protection of property, and thus the size of the market, will be more limited the
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larger transaction costs are, regardless of whether the latter are driven by frictions outside
the control of traders—e.g., financial inefficiencies—or endogenously determined by the mix
of the dispersion in the traders’ valuations and either the original owners’ market power or
their privileged information.1 I reach similar conclusions when I turn to investment interac-
tions and I study a society equally split into randomly matched downstream and upstream
firms. The new technology requires the provision by the upstream firm of an input whose
random cost is realized after the downstream firm has borne an upfront expense. While both
costs and the firms’ payoffs are observable, unverifiable, and ex ante non contractible, only
the cost of the input is ex post contractible. Without loss of generality in particular, I main-
tain that after the preliminary phase the upstream firm has all the bargaining power and
so tries to hold-up his match by asking the high-cost realization. The downstream firm can
then either accept to pay the inflated cost, switch to the old technology, or turn to the legal
system. In the last case, the payoffs are determined by the upstream firms’ property rights,
which capture now the odds with which the downstream firm must accept the high cost.
This assumption squares with the idea that courts exploit unverifiable information to favor
the party they prefer regardless of the contract terms (Gennaioli, 2013). When the protec-
tion of property is strong, the risk of being held-up discourages the downstream firms from
innovating. When instead the upstream firms are only weakly protected, low-productivity
downstream firms inefficiently exploit the input. Balancing these two misallocations entails
that the protection of property rights (size of the market) will be weaker (larger) the greater
incomplete contracting costs are, i.e., the higher is the probability of low-cost realization.
Crucially, all the model implications survive when a group of traders/innovators has a
larger political influence on institutional design and when the disincentive to effort effect of
weak property rights is taken into account, and they apply to a wider range of cases. To
elaborate on the last point, the legal expropriation by a potential buyer (downstream firm)
is strategically similar to a condoned squatting of either a land or a building, the compulsory
licensing granted to an intellectual property infringer, a majority stockholder’s legal capacity
1Then, transaction costs result from the transfer of property rights. A broad law and economics tradition
brands this definition as inconsistent with the Coase theorem, which would imply that transaction costs are
instead those of “establishing and maintaining property rights” [Allen 1999, p. 898]. Nonetheless, ex-post
misallocation and not the incentives to protect property and inquire about title is the dimension key for
institutional design if both prices and expropriation are endogenous (Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, 2015).
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to tunnel creditors’ and minority shareholders’ resources out of a firm, and the discretion of a
principal to lawfully segment a market (an agent’s power to successfully breach a contract).
To evaluate the central model predictions, I analyze a panel of 135 countries for which
the Executive Opinion Survey—EOS, hereafter—run by the World Economic Forum report
measures of the protection of personal, intellectual, and financial property and proxies for
transaction costs between 2006 and 2015 (see table 1). The EOS is the longest-running survey
of the opinions of business leaders on a broad range of topics for which statistics are unreli-
able, outdated, or nonexistent (WEF, 2015).2 Starting with the metrics of property rights, I
consider three indicators ranging between one and seven and gaging respectively the protec-
tion of generic property including financial assets—i.e., Property-Rights, the defense of in-
tellectual property rights including anti-counterfeiting measures—i.e., Intellectual-Property,
and the safeguard of the interests of minority shareholders, i.e., Shareholders-Protection (see
table 2 for the definition and sources of these and the remaining variables used in the present
study). Being these rights typically assigned to the downstream firms providing the main
productive resources [Burk and McDonnel 2007, p. 594], the three aforementioned indexes
constitute an inverse (direct) metrics of the property rights of the upstream (downstream)
firms. The maps in figure 1 visualize the strong correlation among these three measures—
nowhere lower than 0.81—and their sizable variation across countries. To draw these maps, I
averaged each variable over time, and then I divided the range of each average into four equal
intervals. In the empirical test instead, I use the continuously measured yearly variables.
Furthermore, I document in the Internet appendix that the evidence remains essentially the
same when I consider objective regulation-based measures of property rights and in partic-
ular the length of adverse possession of personal property and the investor protection index
developed by the Doing Business project.3 Turning to the proxies for transaction costs,
I consider measures of the severity of both market frictions—i.e., excessive regulation and
financial inefficiencies—and failures, i.e., lack of the competitiveness of corporate activity,
lemons-type distortions, and incomplete contracting costs due to asset specificities.
2The 2015 edition gathered more than 14,000 responses in 144 countries (WEF, 2015). I substitute missing
observations with the closest data points. This choice is immaterial to the gist of the analysis.
3Adverse possession is a form of property rights acquisition such that a possessor becomes the legal owner
of a good without the original owner’s consent, but by virtue of a sufficiently long, open, continuous, and
notorious possession. The relative proxy however has no time variation (Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, 2015).
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OLS estimates suggest that the protection of personal, intellectual, and financial property
is the weakest where market frictions and failures are the largest and asset specificities are
the most limited. Albeit consistent with the main model predictions, these results may be
capturing reverse causality, may be driven by the confounding effect of omitted variables, or
may be attenuated by the error in the measurement of transaction costs.
Accordingly, I pursue three strategies to determine if the correlations I uncover are,
in fact, causal. First, I control not only for country and year fixed effects, but also for
the development level, inclusiveness of political institutions, level of nonproduced output,
external and internal conflicts, and human capital. Considering these observables together
leaves the results almost intact. Second, I use insights from Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005)
to calculate how much greater the influence of unobservable factors, relative to observables,
would need to be to explain away the negative links between property rights and transaction
costs. I find that the influence of unobservables would have to be on average sixty times
greater than that of all observables considered together, which seems unlikely. Finally,
I devise a 2SLS approach based on the positive dependence of market failures (incomplete
contracting costs) on the dispersion in the traders’ valuations (likelihood of a more productive
technology) foreseen by the model. To elaborate, I document strong negative (positive) first-
stages between the measures of exogenous transaction costs, the extent of market power, and
lemons-type distortions (asset specificities) and proxies for both the availability of the latest
technologies and the quality of math and science education. These results are consistent with
recent firm-level evidence suggesting that the distance to the technology frontier—and thus
the difference in the desirability of old and new products—is smaller in countries endowed
with a human capital more apt to absorb ideas and knowledge and in which therefore the
likelihood of a more productive technology is larger (An˜o´n Higo´n et al., 2017). Conditional
on all observables, the 2SLS estimates are very similar to the OLS ones, and the validity
of the exclusion restriction is vindicated by two extra results. First, the Kleibergen-Paap
test always rejects under-identification at the 1 percent or less. Second, the overidentifying
restrictions cannot be rejected at a level nowhere lower than 5 percent, and the excluded
instruments have no direct role in the semi-reduced form regressions. All in all, this evidence
makes it difficult to envision that OLS correlations are spuriously driven by reverse causation,
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a mechanism different from the one I model, or measurement error. Accordingly, I take them
as consistent with, if not proving, causality running from transaction costs to property rights.
The present study is strictly related to several strands of literature. First, a legacy
of recent contributions shows that weak property rights can be optimal in an endowment
economy (Jordan, 2006; Bar-Gill and Persico, 2016; Segal and Whinston, 2016; Arrun˜ada,
Zanarone, and Garoupa, 2017). Not only do I extend this result to production economies
by clarifying how weak property rights can curb market frictions and partially solve market
failures,4 but I also highlight the relationships between the latter and either the dispersion
in the traders’ valuations or the likelihood of a more productive technology. Accordingly, my
analysis is also related to a body of research—still in its infancy—on endogenous transaction
costs (Dari-Mattiacci, 2012; Barry, Hatfield, and Kominers, 2014).5 Finally, Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) focus on the relative importance of protecting property rights and enforcing
contracts, whereas I examine the determinants of the trade-off between these two institutional
strategies created by the possibility of transferring value without consent. Differently from
this contribution moreover, I also emphasize that weak property rights are society’s response
to the existence of sizable transaction costs and thus their negative correlation with economic
outcomes might be partly spurious (see for a similar argument Aghion et al., [2010]).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I discuss the basic relationships between
property rights and transaction costs to motivate my more general model, which I illustrate
in section 3. Next, I assess whether these correlations are indeed causal in section 4. Finally,
I conclude in section 5, and I gather the proofs, tables, and figures in the appendix.
2 Property Rights and Transaction Costs
While all legal systems punish theft and embezzlement and provide remedies for the
dispossessed owners, the protection of property against private expropriation is almost never
complete as clearly displayed in the maps in figure 1. When transaction costs are sizable
indeed, a private party is often allowed to take someone else’s property with or without
4Albeit based on the same basic model, Guerriero (2016a) focuses instead on the relationship between property
rights and the heterogeneity in the potential buyers’ valuations and does not consider either the issue of
technology adoption or the related problem of identifying the drivers of incomplete contracting costs.
5While the former emphasizes the feedback of legal rules on transaction costs, the latter draw a link between
transaction costs and how egalitarian is the distribution of the collective gains from Coasean bargaining.
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paying compensation (Bouckaert and De Geest, 1995). To cast a first glance at whether this
pattern accurately describes also the EOS data, I consider one to seven indexes capturing
the severity of financial inefficiencies and the relevance of the market failures analyzed in the
model, i.e., market power, lemons-type distortions, and incomplete contracting costs.
Starting with the first one, I consider an index measuring the financial sector difficulties
in providing products and services to businesses, i.e., Unavailability-Financing. A value of
one suggests that it provides a wide variety, whereas a value of seven implies that it does not
provide them at all. For what concerns market power, I employ an index capturing the lack
of competitiveness of corporate activity, i.e., Market-Dominance. A value of one suggests
that corporate activity is spread among many firms, whereas a value of seven implies that
it is dominated by few business groups. Turning to lemons-type distortions, I focus on an
index falling with the extent of information used by buyers to make purchasing decisions, i.e.,
Asymmetric-Information. A value of one suggests that purchases are based on a sophisticated
analysis of attributes, whereas a value of seven implies that they are based solely on the lowest
price. Finally, I capture asset specificities with a measure of the competitive advantage of
the country’s companies in international markets, i.e., Asset-Specificities. A value of one
suggests that it is represented by low cost labor or natural resources, whereas a value of
seven implies that it is constituted by unique products and processes.
Conditional on country and year fixed effects, the partial correlations between the mea-
sures of property rights and Unavailability-Financing, Market-Dominance, and Asymmetric-
Information (Asset-Specificities) in figures 2 to 4 (figure 5) reveal that there are strong nega-
tive (positive) links between the legal protection of the original owners’ (downstream firms’)
property and market frictions and failures (asset specificities), which are based on a sizable
within variation and not driven by a handful of abnormal observations.6 Columns (2), (3),
(5), and (6) of table 3 report estimates of these correlation from regressions obtained from the
subsamples for which I observe all the additional controls illustrated in section 4.1.1 and with
standard errors allowing for clustering by country. In particular, a one-standard-deviation
rise in Unavailability-Financing, Market-Dominance, or Asymmetric-Information (Asset-
Specificities)—roughly 1 (0.9)—is associated with about a 0.3(0.4)-standard-deviation—i.e.,
6My results are similar when I exclude the outliers identified through the Cook’s distance (Cook 1977).
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around 1—fall (rise) in the strength of property rights. These coefficients are all significant
at 5 percent or better and are coherent with the evidence coming from two alternative one
to seven indexes of market frictions and failures (see columns (1) and (4) of table 3). While
the former gages the burden of administrative requirements on firms—i.e., Over-Regulation,
the latter measures the impact of non-tariff barriers on the ability of imported goods to com-
pete with domestic ones, i.e., Trade-Barriers. More generally, I document in the Internet
appendix that the negative (positive) links between the original owners’ (downstream firms’)
property rights and market frictions and failures (asset specificities) survive when the latter
are proxied by either the necessity of bribery for the daily activity of firms, their difficulty to
obtain a bank loan, the hurdle they face when raising money by issuing shares on the stock
market, or the lack of competitiveness of local markets (extent of production sophistication).
Next, I present a model of the design of property rights on exchangeable value and
innovation activities rationalizing several legal issues included the evidence discussed so far.
3 Theory
I first analyze the case in which transaction costs are driven by frictions outside the
control of traders (innovators), and then I turn to characterize the scenario in which they
are endogenously determined by the mix of the dispersion in the traders’ valuations and
either the original owners’ market power or their privileged information (the likelihood of a
more productive technology and the incompleteness of contracts). Finally, I document that
the key model implications survive when the economy becomes “political” and thus someone
is excluded from the institutional design (see section 3.3.1) and when the original owners
can decide whether to produce or invest in their property (see section 3.3.2).
3.1 Property Rights and Exogenous Transaction Costs
Following Guerriero (2016a), I consider a society composed by a mass one of original
owners and a mass one of potential buyers, all having linear utility over a good x (see
footnote 14 for the risk aversion case). While the original owners value x at v, the potential
buyers have a valuation λ uniformly distributed over
[
λ, λ
]
with l ≡ λ− λ, λ > v > λ, and
λm ≡
(
λ+ λ
)
/2. I employ the uniform distribution to obtain closed form solutions, but in
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the appendix I show that the results hold under more generic density functions.
Original owners are randomly matched to potential buyers by an intermediation technol-
ogy allowing the latter to either obtain the good via consensual transfer by paying the former
v and bearing positive transaction costs α or expropriate it at no cost. The assumption that
expropriation is costless does not bear any loss of generality.7 α has no social value and
gages inefficiencies like the costs borne by potential buyers to borrow v or those necessary to
legalize the transfer and due to bribery, bargaining costs, excessive regulation, or a foreign
intermediary’s mark-up.8 I posit that α < min
{
v, λ− v}, and I discuss this assumption in
footnotes 11, 12, and 13. An expropriated x is returned back with odds γ, which thus sum-
marizes the legal protection of the original owner’s property rights or the odds with which
the original owner is protected by a property rule as opposed to 1− γ, which is the chance
with which the potential buyer is shielded by a liability rule (Calabresi and Melamed, 1972).
One glaring example of the type of expropriation just discussed is that of an intermediary
(agent) selling to a buyer in good-faith a good stolen (embezzled) from an original owner (his
principal) at a low price. As happens in the model, then the good is possibly given back to
its original owner and the strength of property rights reduces the probability that the buyer
consumes. More generally, when the potential buyer directly steals x, only with probability
γ the legal system forces her to hand the good back to its original owner. All in all, then
γ will be larger the longer the buyer needs to wait before acquiring ownership by adverse
possession, the stronger are the remedies in the original owner’s hands, and the more effective
is public enforcement (Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, 2015). The model however applies to
a large array of legal instances. First, the good can be envisaged as an input producing a
fixed value when transformed via the “old” technology in the hands of the original owners
and an uncertain one when the “new” technology is applied by the potential buyers. Second,
expropriation can assume the form of the squatting of either a piece of land or a building
(Brueckner and Selod, 2009).9 Third, the conflict between an original owner and a potential
7The model implications survive when expropriation entails either an expensive effort or a punishment and if
the liability rule prescribes positive damages, provided that these cost are not too large (Guerriero, 2016a).
8Notably, the setup I consider can be interpreted as an efficient market maker assigning high-valuation
potential buyers to original owners in exchange for the wasteful payment α.
9The good can be conceived as having a fixed value for the original owner and an uncertain one for the state
as in the instances regulated by “partial taking” law. Then, the state pays severance damages (1− γ) v to
the original owner to compensate a partial expropriation by the potential buyer (Sackman at al., 2013).
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buyer can be reinterpreted as the one involving the creator of an intellectual property and an
infringer with 1−γ being the chance of either exhaustion of the related rights or compulsory
licensing (Ghosh, 2014; Bond and Saggi, 2017). Fourth, the same tension is isomorphic to
that between a creditor/minority shareholder and a majority stockholder who can tunnel
resources out of the firm through a complaisant management (Johnson et al., 2000). Finally,
the very same interaction is strategically similar to that setting an agent against a principal
in a segmented labor, financial or housing market with 1− γ gaging the principal’s capacity
to lawfully operate in the secondary segment (Piazzesi, Schneider, and Stroebel, 2017).
At time t0, γ is chosen to maximize the social welfare, which is the sum of the original
owners’ and potential buyers’ utilities. At time t1, individuals learn who they are and,
thus, their valuation. At time t2, individuals are matched by the intermediation technology.
Finally at time t3, any expropriated x is given back to its original owner with probability γ.
In evaluating the foregoing, two remarks should be stressed. First, an alternative in-
strument in the hands of society is to decrease α. This policy reduces market distortions
leading to complete property rights (see footnotes 11 and 12), but it is very costly to im-
plement because of political imperfections (Besley and Ghatak, 2010) and the opposition of
those agents who gain from larger transaction costs (see section 3.2 and Barry, Hatfield, and
Kominers, [2014]). Second, the model implication are unaffected when the original owners
have heterogeneous valuations and the traders can bargain over the price (Guerriero, 2016a).
3.1.1 Equilibrium
A potential buyer buys if her valuation λ net of the purchasing costs v + α is greater
than her expected payoff from expropriation (1− γ)λ or λ ≥ λˆ ≡ v+α
γ
.10 When selecting
the optimal property rights level γ∗,11 society then maximizes the strictly concave function
∫ λ
λˆ
λ− α
l
dλ+
∫ λˆ
λ
(1− γ)λ+ γv
l
dλ (1)
10Provided that only one good can be consumed, the results continue to stand even if those x that are purchased
can be expropriated before consumption since all those willing to expropriate have already done it.
11The objective function in equation (1) is strictly concave for α < v. Should this inequality fail, γ∗ will be 1 (0)
for v < λm if the social welfare is larger at 1 (0) than it is at 0 (1) or whenever (v + α)
2−2 (αλ+ vλ)+λ2 >
(≤)0. This last inequality is more difficult to satisfy the larger α is because of the hypothesis v + α < λ.
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for λˆ < λ or γ∗ ∈
(
v+α
λ
, 1
]
and the full expropriation social welfare (1− γ)λm + γv ≡ W FE
whenever λˆ ≥ λ and therefore all potential buyers prefer to expropriate.
Switching from complete to incomplete property rights—i.e., from γ∗ = 1 to γ∗ < 1—
has three effects: 1. it saves α at the cost of misallocating x with probability γ∗ for the
v+α ≤ λ < λˆ matches; 2. it avoids misallocation with probability 1−γ∗ for the v ≤ λ < v+α
matches by expanding the consumption set of the potential buyers; 3. it misallocates x with
probability 1 − γ∗ for the λ < v matches. While this last effect is negative, the sum of the
first two is positive, provided that α is not too small.12 For λˆ < λ, optimal property rights
are uniquely defined by the necessary and sufficient first-order condition
−2dλˆ
dγ
(
γ∗λˆ− γ∗v − α
)
−
(
λˆ2 − λ2
)
+ 2v
(
λˆ− λ
)
= 0↔ (γ∗)2 = v
2 − α2
λ (2v − λ) . (2)
Equation (2) implies that a rise in γ has a marginal effect, which is positive, and an infra-
marginal effect
∫ λˆ
λ
v−λ
l
dλ = −(λˆ−λ)(λˆ+λ−2v)
2l
, which can be negative only if v < λm. For
v ≥ λm then, optimal property rights are complete since also W FE rises with γ. For v < λm
instead, W FE falls with γ and a γ∗ ≤ 1 is possible. It equals either the level defined by
equation (2) or 0 depending on which of the two maximizes the social welfare. The latter is
more likely the case the larger α is.13 Moreover, an interior γ∗ falls with α (see figure 2).
Intuitively, a rise in α has the infra-marginal effect of reducing the potential buyer’s
payoff for all the λ ≥ λˆ matches and the marginal effect of raising λˆ and thus misallocating
goods otherwise earmarked to high-valuation potential buyers with probability γ∗. Both
effects call for weaker property rights. Proposition 1 rephrases this idea:14
Proposition 1: Optimal property rights γ∗ weakly fall with the transaction costs α.
Proposition 1 is not only consistent with the preliminary evidence discussed in section 2
and the more in depth analysis in section 4, but it also sheds light on several institutionalized
cases of incomplete property rights. First, it rationalizes the post-war condoning of power
12Precisely, if α2 > (1− γ) v2. Moreover, γ∗ < 1 whenever α > v − λ, which can be given my assumptions.
13The exact condition is γ∗
(
λ− v) > α, which is true for the lowest interior γ∗ = (v + α)λ−1 if α < λ− v.
14If risk-averse, the traders who gain an expected utility lower than that prevailing under the certain scenario
of full property rights incur also a loss u. Since all original owners (potential buyers) weakly prefer complete
(incomplete) property rights, a rise in risk aversion is isomorphic to a fall in v and thus induces a weakly
lower γ∗. Indeed, an increase in v has the infra-marginal effect of boosting the original owners’ payoff when
property rights are protected and the marginal effect of raising λˆ. Both patterns imply a higher γ∗.
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thefts by Indian farmers. In fact, despite its annual cost is around 1.5 percentage points of the
2012 GDP, local politicians have been strenuously defending it by asserting that collecting the
electricity invoices, which are mainly constituted by billing costs, would destroy subsistence
farming (Charnoz and Swain, 2012). Second, the cost of eviction or the inability to provide a
sufficient supply of housing because of regulatory requirements and speculative land-holding
are the most recurring justifications to the tolerance towards the roughly 40 percent share of
private lands invaded in developing countries and the two billion squatters estimated around
the world (Brueckner and Selod, 2009). Third, exhaustion of intellectual property rights
has been mainly implemented in high-transaction costs developing countries (Ghosh, 2014),
whereas the Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement allows the participants to impose compulsory
licensing if the commercial terms for a voluntary license are “unreasonable” (Bond and Saggi,
2017). Finally, Piazzesi, Schneider, and Stroebel (2017) conclude that financial costs explain
14 percent of the price gap between first and secondary housing market segments.
3.2 Property Rights and Endogenous Transaction Costs
Next, I evaluate several key instances of endogenously determined transaction costs.
3.2.1 Property Rights and Market Power
Following Guerriero (2016a), I consider the case in which the intermediation technology
is in the hands of the original owners and α is the mark-up on their valuation v. They select
it between t1 and t2 by maximizing the sum of the expected profits and the expected payoff
from consuming x when handed back, i.e.,
(v+α)(λ−λˆ)
l
+ γ∗v (
λˆ−λ)
l
for v+α
γ∗ = λˆ < λ and γ
∗v
otherwise. Then, α∗ can be positive only for λˆ < λ when it equals α∗ =
γ∗(λ+v)
2
− v and
rises with the strength of property rights, which in turn increases the original owners’ payoff
regardless of whether transfers are consensual. A rise in γ∗ reduces instead the potential
buyers’ payoff from expropriating and, through its positive impact on α∗, their utility from
buying x. Because of the linearity of preferences, the two effects cancel out and dλˆ
dγ∗ = 0 (see
the Appendix). Since α is now a transfer, γ∗ < 1 if the distortions in the potential buyers’
demand are sizable. Being λˆ = λ+v
2
< λ, society maximizes the linear function
∫ λ
λˆ
λ
l
dλ+
∫ λˆ
λ
(1− γ)λ+ γv
l
dλ, (3)
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whose derivative with respect to γ for v < λm is negative for α
∗ > (2v − λ) γ∗ − v or
λ + 2λ > 3v and positive otherwise. Then, γ∗ possibly jumps from 0 to 1 as α∗ becomes
sufficiently small. For γ∗ = 1, α∗ = (
λ−v)
2
and the mark-up increases with the difference
between high-valuation potential buyers’ and original owners’ valuation. Again, optimal
property rights must be complete if v ≥ λm. Proposition 2 takes stock of this analysis:
Proposition 2: The optimal property rights level γ∗ weakly decreases with the mark-up
α∗, which in turn is larger the higher the dispersion in the traders’ valuations λ− v is.
Proposition 2 not only rationalizes some of the results discussed in sections 2 and 4, but
it also helps make sense of growing evidence on the weakness of property rights on renewable
resources in the presence of market power. Common access to the fishing harvest together
with individual transferable quotas indeed is more often observed in Nova Scotia and New
Zealand where the fishermen’s market power is the strongest (Croutzet and Lasserre, 2017).15
3.2.2 Property Rights and Lemons-type Distortions
As noticed by Hasen and McAdams (1997), “theft may avoid the “lemons” problem.” Fol-
lowing Guerriero (2016a), I maintain here that the original owners have private information
on v, which is drawn from an uniform distribution with support
[
0, λ
]
and correlated with
the valuation of the potential buyers. In particular, ∆/2 of them value x at θv, 1 −∆ > 0
of them have valuation αv, and the remainder gain from consuming x a payoff v/θ with
θ > 2 > α > 1. Here, θ gages the polarization of the potential buyers’ preferences, α
covers the role that exogenous transaction costs have in the basic setup and represents a
measure of the difference between the payoff of the middle-valuation potential buyers and
the valuation of the original owners, and a rise in ∆ constitutes a mean-preserving spread of
the λ distribution. These three parameters emphasize the impact of lemon-type distortions
on allocative efficiency in the regime L. To illustrate, middle and low-valuation potential
buyers expropriate (do not consume) if γ∗ < (=) 1 since the expected value of x is pL/2 at
the exogenous price pL. Original owners indeed sell only if v ≤ pL. High-valuation potential
buyers buy (expropriate) if γ∗ ≥ (<) 2
θ
, and society maximizes the linear function
15Focusing on the fishing industry, Croutzet and Lasserre (2017) also show that the strength of the property
rights on renewable resources should fall with the elasticity of output to effort and rise with the price elasticity
of demand, the number of firms, and the difference between input and output values.
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θλm
∆
2
+ (1−∆) [(1− γ)αλm + γλm] +
[
(1− γ) λm
θ
+ γλm
]
∆
2
(4)
for γ∗ ≥ 2
θ
and (1− γ)
[
(1−∆)α + θ2+1
θ
∆
2
]
λm + γλm otherwise. Hence, the derivative of
society’s problem with respect to γ is positive for γ∗ ≥ 2
θ
and both 1−∆ and α sufficiently
small and it is negative otherwise. Intuitively, as the share of middle-valuation potential
buyers for which x will be misallocated under complete property rights becomes less im-
portant because of a rise in heterogeneity, γ∗ jumps from 0 to 1 for α small. Similarly, a
sufficiently large rise in lemons-type distortions α induces a decrease in the optimal property
rights level from 1 to 0 for ∆ small. Proposition 3 recaps the analysis of this section:
Proposition 3: Optimal property rights γ∗ weakly fall with the lemon-type distortions
α, which in turn constitute a measure of the dispersion in the traders’ valuations.
Proposition 3 not only clears up some of the evidence illustrated in sections 2 and 4, but
it also helps explain recent stylized facts about sharing economies. In particular, Lee (2016)
builds on 2008 data on BitTorrent private-network file sharing activity and album sales to
conclude that the former has no impact (a positive effect) on top(mid)-tier artists’ sales for
which asymmetric information on perceived talent is the least (most) detrimental.
3.2.3 Property Rights and Incomplete Contracting Costs
Setup.—Consider now a mass one of upstream firms and a mass one of downstream firms.
The latter can employ two technologies to produce x. The “old” one does not necessitate
any input from the upstream firm, and it produces one unit of output of value δλ with δ < 1,
λ uniformly distributed over
[
λ, λ
]
, l ≡ λ− λ, λ > v > λ, and λm ≡
(
λ+ λ
)
/2. The “new”
technology instead delivers one unit of output of value λ and requires first an upfront payment
v by the downstream firm, and then the provision by the upstream firm of an input whose
cost c is realized after the preliminary phase and equals 0 with probability 0 < α < 1 and
(1− δ)λ otherwise.16 While both costs and the firms’ payoffs are observable, unverifiable,
and ex ante non contractible, only the cost of the input is ex post contractible. Without loss
of generality in particular, I maintain that after the preliminary phase the upstream firm has
16Should the low cost be µ < (1− δ)λ, the social welfare will equal α ∫ λ
λˆ
λ−v
l dλ+(1− α)
∫ λ
λˆ
λ−v−µ
l dλ+
∫ λˆ
λ
δλ
l dλ
with λˆ ≡ v+γα1−δ ≥ λ˜ and the whole argument of this section will go through unchanged.
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all the bargaining power. Hence, the cost uncertainty creates with odds α an “appropriable
quasi-rent” (1− δ)λ, which is larger the more productive the new technology is relative to
the old one, and in turn the incentive for the upstream firm to always claim that c = (1− δ)λ
(Barzel, 1989).17 Only with probability γ yet, the upstream firm is legally allowed to charge
the high cost. Hence, γ captures the strength of the upstream firm’s property rights on
his input relative to the power of the downstream firms’ property rights on x. When the
input is an idea or know-how for instance, v might be seen as the expenses supported by
the downstream firm to let the upstream firm understand how to incorporate his input in
the old production process, c is the cost of providing the input, and γ can be interpreted as
the probability that, in a lawsuit for breach of contract launched by the downstream firm, a
court allows the upstream firm to charge for the input provision (1− δ)λ instead of 0. This
setup squares with the idea that courts display personal biases and arbitrarily evaluate the
evidence when certain states are hard to verify and so subject to interpretation (Gennaioli,
2013). Then, the parameter γ can also be seen as the share of pro-upstream firm courts.
The timing of the institutional and economic activities is as follows. At time t0, γ is
chosen to maximize the social welfare, which is the sum of upstream and downstream firms’
payoffs. At time t1, each downstream firm selects her preferred technology. If the old one
is employed, production is immediate, otherwise the downstream firm is matched to an
upstream one and the two firms sign a contract establishing that in time t2 the latter has
residual rights on his input and all bargaining power at renegotiation (Grossman and Hart,
1986). At time t2, first the preliminary phase is concluded, then the upstream firm makes a
take-it-or-leave-it request to the downstream firm. Next, the latter can either accept, reject
and turn to the old technology, or reject and exploit the available legal remedies. In this last
case, the downstream and upstream firms’ payoffs are determined by the prevailing γ.
Interpretation.—The parameter α should be seen as a general measure of incomplete
contracting costs. To elaborate, the conflict between upstream and downstream firms re-
sembles again that between a creditor/minority shareholder and a majority stockholder who
can tunnel value out of the firm through a complaisant management asserting that investing
17Under the usual assumption of Nash bargaining indeed, the upstream firm will require for c = 0 an input
price equal to (1− δ) λ2 . Then, the new technology will be adopted for all λ larger than 2vα(1−δ) , which is
inefficiently higher than λ˜, and the gist of the whole analysis will continue to hold true.
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in a new activity needs resources that are ex ante non contractible. Similarly, the contrast
between the two firms is strategically equal to the interaction between a principal and an
agent who can breach their contract by claiming that the ex ante non contractible cost of
using a new technology is (1− δ)λ instead of being 0 (Ganglmair, 2017).
Equilibrium.—For γ∗ = 1, the downstream firm obtains δλ− v with the new technology
and δλ with the old one. She prefers the latter and the social welfare is
∫ λ
λ
δλ
l
dλ, which is
inefficiently lower than that under the ex ante efficient equilibrium prescribing innovation
and a downstream’s (upstream’s) expected payoff of αλ+ (1− α) δλ (0) for λ ≥ λ˜ ≡ v
α(1−δ) .
Incomplete property rights solve this hold-up failure since they allow the downstream firm
to obtain from adopting the new technology λ−v with probability 1−γ and δλ−v otherwise
and the upstream firm to get from the input provision the expected loss (1− α) (1− δ)λ
with probability 1− γ and the expected gain α (1− δ)λ otherwise. Hence, the downstream
firm will prefer the new technology for λ ≥ λˆ ≡ v
(1−δ)(1−γ) , and the upstream firm will produce
only if property rights are sufficiently strong or γ
∗
(1−γ∗) ≥ 1−αα ↔ γ∗ ≥ 1− α. For γ∗ ≥ 1− α
and λˆ < λ, society maximizes the following strictly concave function
α
∫ λ
λˆ
λ− v
l
dλ+ (1− α)
∫ λ
λˆ
δλ− v
l
dλ+
∫ λˆ
λ
δλ
l
dλ, (5)
which decreases with γ for−dλˆ
dγ
[
αλˆ+ (1− α) δλˆ− v − δλˆ
]
= − v2(α−1+γ)
(1−δ)(1−γ)3 ≤ 0 or if γ ≥ 1−α.
To elaborate, a rise in γ ≥ 1−α has the welfare decreasing marginal effect of shrinking the set
of matches for which the downstream firm adopts the new technology. Yet, a γ∗ weakly larger
than 1− α is necessary to push the upstream firm to participate in the production process.
Therefore, γ∗ = 1−α. In other words, the larger the odds α of a positive appropriable quasi-
rent are and thus the more severe asset specificities are, the lower γ∗ should be to convince
the downstream firm to adopt the new technology and the upstream firm to provide his
input.18 Crucially, the latter is indifferent between charging as input price the expected cost
and holding-up the downstream firm given γ∗. By assuming that if indifferent he selects the
former strategy, then the setup produces no hold-up in equilibrium. For α large moreover, the
18This incentive will be unnecessary, should the cost be certain. In this case, full property rights will contem-
poraneously solve the hold-up failure and assure the upstream firm’s participation constraint.
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welfare under incomplete property rights and innovation is larger than that with γ∗ = 1 and
without innovation. The latter also describes the scenario in which λˆ ≥ λ↔ v ≥ α (1− δ)λ.
Proposition 4 summarizes the main conclusions of this section:
Proposition 4: Optimal property rights γ∗ fall with the incomplete contracting costs α,
which in turn measure the likelihood that the new technology is more productive.
Recognizing that both parties should be incentivized to foster technological diffusion,
proposition 4 entails that, differently from Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
(1990), and Williamson (2010), asset allocation is optimized by alternatively leaving residual
claimant each party. This result has key ramifications for the theory of the firm.19
More generally, the findings of this section are not only coherent with some of the es-
timates discussed in sections 2 and 4, but they also help make sense of anecdotal evidence
on the positive link between the strength of the downstream firm’s intellectual property
rights—a high 1 − γ∗—and the severity of asset specificities. In particular, Burk and Mc-
Donnel (2007) document that stronger and easier to obtain downstream firm’s intellectual
property rights—i.e., trade secrecy and copyright instead of patents—are typically granted
whenever asset specificities are particularly severe, i.e., technological businesses, such as the
software industry, and the entertainment industries.20 Furthermore, these remedies allow the
downstream firm to impose on her employees and upstream partners non-disclosure agree-
ments, work-for-hire provisions, and non-compete clauses reducing their ability to exploit
proprietary information, i.e., a low γ∗ (Burk and McDonnel, 2007). “From the standpoint of
employee incentive [indeed], trade secrecy [and copyright are the] most expensive method of
protection [since they include] forms of intellectual capital most likely to become commingled
[. . . ] from the skills or knowledge of an employee” [Burk and McDonnel 2007, p. 609].
3.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, I document the robustness of the main model implications to two key
alternative assumptions, i.e., the possibility that part of the population is excluded from
19Guerriero (2017) shows that the model prediction survives if the firms can choose whether to vertically inte-
grate and that this happens more often when asset specificities (property rights) are more severe (stronger).
20First, trade secrecy and copyright arise spontaneously, upon fixation of a creative work in a tangible medium
of expression, whereas patent are granted only upon the disclosure of the claimed invention (Burk and
McDonnel, 2007). Second, they receive a longer protection, i.e., respectively perpetual monopoly and the
author’s life plus 50 to 100 years rather than the 20 years of patent protection (Burk and McDonnel, 2007).
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institutional design and the possibility for the original owners to decide whether to produce
the good or to invest on it before trading (see the appendix for the relative proofs).
3.3.1 The Political Economy of Property Rights Protection
Thus far, I have examined the design of property rights on exchangeable value under a
perfect veil of ignorance, behind which everybody is identical, and the choice of property
rights on innovation by downstream and upstream firms with equal size and in turn political
power. Reality is however much less ideal. To evaluate the positive side of property rights
protection, I consider a situation in which the group of agents selecting γ either knows his
future role in the economy or is endowed with important inputs and so can exclude the rest
of the population from the social welfare maximization (Alesina, Aghion, and Trebbi, 2004).
It seems natural to think of these “insiders” as the original owners and the potential buyers
with moderate valuations. This approach incorporates into the model the idea put forward
by a growing literature on endogenous lobbying that the groups actively participating in
policy-making and shaping reforms are those most affected by them (Felli and Merlo, 2006;
Guerriero, 2016b). Here, these are original owners and middle-valuation potential buyers.
In the case of exogenously determined transaction costs then, γ∗ maximizes
∫ λ
λˆ
λ−α
l
dλ+∫ λˆ
λ+
(1−γ)λ+γv
l
dλ + γv
l
for λˆ < λ and W FE − (1− γ) 2+2λ
2l
otherwise when the excluded
potential buyers have valuation lower than λ+ and  not too large. Comparing this objective
function with that in equation (1) suggests that γ∗ still falls with α for  not too large, but
it is set inefficiently high, e.g., Zamindari system of taxation allowing Indian landowners to
evict evading tenants who were often more productive (Besley and Ghatak, 2010). If instead
to be excluded are the potential buyers whose valuation is higher than λ − , γ∗ decreases
with α for  small and equals (is higher than) the γ∗ found in the basic setup if interior
(otherwise). When instead the transaction costs are driven by market power, α∗ continues
to be determined as in section 3.2.1 and thus a rise in γ still has only an infra-marginal
effect on society’s objective function. As a result, equation (3) implies that the analysis is
unchanged when high-valuation potential buyers are excluded from the institutional design
and that γ∗ is set too high and falls with α∗ for  small when instead low-valuation potential
buyers are kept out. Similarly, in the scenario of transaction costs determined by lemon-
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type distortions, a gaze at equation (4) suggests that equilibrium property rights are again
inefficiently high and decrease with α provided that  is not too large. Finally, a glance
at equation (5) clarifies that excluding a sufficiently small group of either high- or low-λ
downstream firms from the institutional design does not affect at all the equilibrium when
the transaction costs are shaped by incomplete contracting inefficiencies.
3.3.2 The Disincentive to Effort Effect of Weak Property Rights
Production.—As highlighted in section 1, all the other contributions documenting that
weak property rights can be optimal focus on endowment economies. Here, I prove that the
mechanisms illustrated in sections 3.1, 3.2.1, and 3.2.2 survive when production is introduced
in the theoretical framework. This time, original owners decide between t1 and t2 whether
to produce x at the cost κ < v. Therefore, there is no production for γ∗ = 0 and λˆ ≥ λ, but
there can be when the original owners’ expected utility is positive for γ∗ > 0 and so λˆ < λ.
To elaborate, the original owners’ expected utility increases with γ∗, and therefore there
is a γ˜ such that x is produced only if γ∗ ≥ γ˜. Since production creates value also for the
potential buyers, society always selects the maximum γˆ between γ˜ and γ∗ for κ not too large.
In the most interesting case of endogenous transaction costs finally, γ˜ weakly decreases with
α for λ sufficiently large and v not too small compared to the transaction costs α. This last
comparative statics leaves qualitatively unaffected the main model testable implication.
Investment.—The standard “security” argument for strong property rights claims that
expropriation induces a disincentive to invest (Besley and Ghatak, 2010). To understand
how the intuition affects the basic results, I analyze a regime I envisioning an investment
possibly implemented by the original owners between t1 and t2 at the cost ζ < v and raising
their valuation v and those of the potential buyers λ to respectively v (1 + ρ) and λ (1 + ρ)
with ρ > 0.21 Accordingly, this setup is similar to the instance of a production economy.
When transaction costs are exogenous, original owners invest only if γ∗I > 0 and their
expected utility v (1 + ρ) λ−λˆI
l
+ γ∗I v (1 + ρ)
λˆI−λ
l
− ζ is weakly positive. Both γ∗I and λˆI are
as in section 3.1.1 with α/ (1 + ρ) in place of α, and thus γ∗I > γ
∗ and λˆI < λˆ. Hence,
investment inducement weakly strengthens property rights protection. Since the original
21Continuous investment choices produce an algebra so tangled to be uninformative about the model robustness
except in the λ large and v small case when the basic analysis stands intact being dρdγ∗ small.
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owners’ expected payoff rises with γ∗I , there is a γ˜I such that investment goes through only if
optimal property rights are larger than γ˜I . For γ
∗
I > γ˜I , society picks γ
∗
I instead of γ
∗ if the
social welfare is larger at γ∗I with investment than it is at γ
∗ without. For γ∗I ≤ γ˜I instead, γ˜I
is preferred to γ∗ if the social welfare is larger at γ˜I with investment than it is at γ∗ without.
To elaborate, investment always goes through for α sufficiently small compared to v and for
ρ (ζ) not too small (large). For v ≥ λm, then γ∗ = 1 and investment materializes.
In the case of transaction costs determined by the existence of market power, the fact that
the original owners’ expected utility is multiplied by 1 + ρ implies that α∗I = α
∗ (1 + ρ) and
so γ∗I = γ
∗ and λˆI = λˆ. Since the original owners’ expected payoff rises with γ∗I , investment
realizes only if γ∗I is larger than γ˜I . As in the production case, γ˜I falls with α when the
mark-up is sufficiently small compared to v. Under the same condition and for ρ (ζ) not too
small (large), society picks the maximum γˆI between γ
∗
I and γI since investment is socially
beneficial. Finally, γ∗I = 1 and thus investment is always successful for v ≥ λm.
For what concerns the scenario of transaction costs driven by lemon-type distortions, a
glance at equation (4) suggests that society’s objective function is now multiplied by 1 + ρ
and the analysis of the basic setup is unchanged provided that α < 2
1+ρ
. High-valuation
potential buyers buy for γ∗ ≥ 2
θ(1+ρ)
and expropriate otherwise. Once again, the original
owners’ expected utility rises with γ∗I , and so investment prevails only if optimal property
rights are larger than γ˜I . Society then selects γˆI if investment is welfare enhancing and, in
particular, if its fixed cost is sufficiently small and its return is sufficiently large.
4 Evidence
The main model implication is that incomplete property rights are efficient when transac-
tion costs impede both trade and innovation whether or not constitution writers are benev-
olent and the disincentive to effort effect of weak property rights is taken into account. As
a consequence, the main model testable prediction can be stated as follows:
Prediction: The strength of the original owners’ (upstream firms’) property rights falls
with the severity of market frictions and failures (incomplete contracting costs), which rises
with the dispersion in the traders’ valuations (likelihood of a more productive technology).
The negative (positive) links between the measures of the protection of personal, in-
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tellectual, and financial property and the proxies for market frictions and failures (asset
specificities) documented in section 2 are consistent with such a prediction. Yet, they may
be capturing reverse causality, they may be driven by the confounding effect of omitted
variables, or they may be attenuated by the error in the measurement of transaction costs.
4.1 Identifying Causal Relationships
I pursue several strategies to evaluate whether the correlations illustrated in section 2 are
causal. First, I control for the other main drivers of property rights discussed by the extant
literature. Second, I use selection on observables to assess the likelihood that the estimates
are driven by unobservables. Finally, I devise a 2SLS approach based on the aforementioned
positive dependence of market friction and failures (incomplete contracting costs) on the
dispersion in the traders’ valuations (likelihood of a more productive technology).22
4.1.1 Controlling for Observables
The key variables potentially omitted from the analysis of section 2 are those shaping
property rights through channels other than the trade-off between inefficient exclusion from
trade/innovation and expropriation and associated with transaction costs. They are the de-
velopment level, the inclusiveness of political institutions, the level of state capacity, internal
conflicts, and the extent of human capital accumulation. Next, I illustrate them in turn.
First, transaction costs could affect property rights through their adverse impact on
economic development, which in turn is related to the protection of private rights through
the modernization effect (Williamson, 2010). Accordingly, I consider the natural logarithm
of the output-side real GDP at chained PPPs in 2011 US dollar per capita, i.e., Income.
Second, less inclusive political institutions obstruct the distribution of the rents from
innovation and trade among non-elite (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009), while easing
the expropriation of the property of private citizens by both politicians and elite members
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). To assess the importance of such a mechanism, I consider the
constraints on the executive authority score from the POLITY IV dataset, i.e., Democracy.23
22For the data aggregated at the cross-sectional level moreover, I can confirm the core of the analysis and I
cannot reject that transaction costs are exogenous and that the overidentifying restrictions hold.
23To illustrate, the score ranges between one and seven and assumes higher values when the holder of the
executive power is accountable to the citizens and/or the government is constrained by checks and balances.
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Third, low levels of non-produced output worsening the disincentive to effort effect, the
incidence of external wars, and German and Scandinavian legal origins are stable predictors
of a state capacity to exchange/innovate and protect private rights (see Besley and Persson,
[2009]; but also Guerriero, [2016b]). While I take into account the last factor through the
country fixed effects, I assess the role of the first two by controlling for the crude oil proved
reserves in barrels per capita—i.e., Reserves—and the share of previous half-century in which
the country was involved in external military conflicts, i.e., Conflict-External.
Fourth, inter-groups conflicts are related to both large transaction costs (Seitz, Tarasov,
and Zakharenko, 2015) and insecure private rights (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). I consider the
role of these connections by incorporating into the analysis the share of previous half-century
in which the country was involved in internal military conflicts, i.e., Conflict-Internal.
Fifth, more limited transaction costs provide incentives for investment in human capital
(Foss, 2011), which in turn helps shift labor from traditional to modern sectors and so
curb inequality and favor institutions that protect private property (Cervellati, Fortunato,
and Sunde, 2008). To evaluate these patterns, I control for the ratio of the total tertiary
enrollment regardless of age to the population of the relative age group, i.e., Human-Capital.
Finally, a culture of morality and the efficiency of public enforcement alter the incentives
of intermediaries and thus the balance between protecting property and enhancing the re-
liance on contracts (Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, 2015).24 Moreover, they may shape the
intensity of both exchange and innovation (Seitz, Tarasov, and Zakharenko, 2015). Esti-
mates reported in the Internet appendix reveal that considering these factors greatly lowers
the number of available observations but leaves essentially intact the gist of the analysis.
Including all these controls in the specification also factors in the heterogeneity in pref-
erence/productivity, which reduces the contribution to the social welfare of the utilities of
those middle-valuation(productivity) potential buyers (downstream firms) whose exclusion
from trade (innovation) is more socially costly (Guerriero, 2016a). Since transaction costs
might be correlated with heterogeneity, this aspect of the identification strategy is key.
24While I proxy a culture of morality with the first principal component extracted from the level of generalized
trust and the importance of respect self-reported to either the World Value Survey or the European Value
Study, I measure the efficiency of public enforcement with the first principal component extracted from the
number of police personnel and that of professional judges per 100,000 inhabitants as collected from the
United Nations’ surveys of crime trends and the operations of criminal justice systems.
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Panels (A) to (C) of table 4 report the estimates relative to the specifications with
dependent variables Property-Rights, Intellectual-Property, and Shareholders-Protection re-
spectively and considering all together the extra controls. The key observations are that
the coefficients on these regressors are generally jointly insignificant, whereas those on the
proxies for transaction costs are negative and significant at 5 percent or better and display a
magnitude almost equal to their counterparts in table 3. In the same spirit, results available
upon request reveal that the impacts of the proxies for transaction costs remain similar when
considered together and that the extra controls contribute only marginally to the total R2.25
4.1.2 Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables
Despite my attempts to control for relevant observable factors, OLS estimates may still
be biased by unobservables. To evaluate this issue, I calculate the index proposed by Altonji,
Elder, and Taber (2005) to measure how much stronger selection on unobservables, relative
to selection on observables, must be to explain away the full estimated effect.26 To see how
the index is calculated, consider a regression with a restricted set of control variables and one
with a full set of controls. Next, denote the estimate of the coefficient attached to a proxy for
transaction costs from the first regression βR, where R stands for “restricted,” and that from
the second regression βF , where F stands for “full.” Then, the index is the absolute value
of βF/(βR − βF ). The intuition behind the formula is as follows. The lower the absolute
value of (βR − βF ) is, the less the estimate of the relevant coefficient is affected by selection
on observables, and the stronger selection on unobservables needs to be to explain away the
entire effect. Moreover, the higher the absolute value of βF is, the greater is the effect that
needs to be explained away by selection on unobservables, and thus the higher is the index.
In table 5, I consider the specifications conditioning only for country and year fixed effects
and reported in table 3 as the restricted regressions and those controlling for all observables
in table 4 as the full regressions. The ratios calculated when the dependent variable is either
Property-Rights, Intellectual-Property, or Shareholders-Protection are reported respectively
in columns (1) to (3). None of them is less than one, and the median and average ratios
25According to the Shapley value decomposition, their contribution amounts on average only to the 13 percent,
whereas the share explained by transaction costs (country and year fixed effects) is the 35 (52) percent.
26I use the version developed by Bellows and Miguel (2009) for possibly endogenous continuous variables.
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are 29.2 and 60. Therefore, to attribute the entire OLS estimates of the coefficients on the
proxies for transaction costs to selection effects, selection on unobservables would have to be
on average sixty times greater than selection on all observables, which seems unlikely.
4.1.3 2SLS Estimates: Property Rights and Endogenous Transaction Costs
My final strategy is to use instrumental variables. This approach requires instruments
that are correlated with transaction costs but uncorrelated with any other dimension affecting
property rights. To achieve this goal, I build on the positive dependence of market failures
(incomplete contracting costs) on the dispersion in the traders’ valuations (likelihood of
a more productive technology), and I use as excluded instruments for transaction costs
two one to seven indexes. The first one captures the availability for firms of the latest
technologies—i.e., Technology-Availability—and the other measures the quality of math and
science education, i.e., Math-Science. This choice is consistent with An˜o´n Higo´n et al.
(2017), who build on over one million firm-level data for 23 EU states between 2003 and
2014 to document that more labor skilled firms are closer to the technology frontier and this
pattern is more accentuated in service sectors. Such results have four crucial implications
for my 2SLS estimation approach. First, countries endowed with a human capital more apt
to absorb ideas and knowledge are those more likely to display not only smaller differences
in firms’ productivity but also a smaller dispersion in the payoffs of their users and thus
a smaller extent of market power and more limited lemons-type distortions. Second, these
are also the countries in which the likelihood of a more productive technology will be larger
(Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2006) and so will be the severity of asset specificities.
Third, it reasonable to think that the very same drivers of market failures determine market
frictions. Accordingly, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) suggest that credit market
imperfections are typical of countries further away from the technology frontier as opposed
to those close to approach it. Finally, it seems unlikely that a society’s inclination to spread
and adopt more effectively innovation is systematically related to the protection of property
rights conditional on the inclusiveness of political institutions, the level of state capacity,
internal conflicts, fixed effects, and especially the level of development and human capital.
Table 6 reports in panels (A) to (C) the 2SLS estimates of the specifications with
24
dependent variables respectively Property-Rights, Intellectual-Property, and Shareholders-
Protection and controlling for all observables. Starting from the first stages, both Technology-
Availability and Math-Science have always a negative (positive) and generally statistically
significant relationship with the proxies for market friction and failures (incomplete contract-
ing costs). Accordingly, I can always reject that the estimated equation is underidentified
at 1 percent. Turning to the second stages, the proxies for market friction and failures
(measure of incomplete contracting costs) have (has) always negative (positive) and strongly
significant—at 1 percent—effects (impact) on the measures of property rights protection and
the attached coefficients (coefficient) display(s) a magnitude very similar to those in table
4. Finally, I cannot reject that the overidentifying restrictions hold at a level nowhere lower
than 5 percent and I document in the Internet appendix that the excluded instruments have
no direct impact on property rights in the semi-reduced form regressions. Overall, these
patterns support the inference made above and confirm the validity of the model prediction.
5 Conclusions
This paper has developed and tested a model clarifying how the protection of property
rights is optimally weakened in the face of sizable costs of trading/innovating, and in par-
ticular market frictions and failures, and how these are more severe whenever the dispersion
in the traders’ valuations and the likelihood of a more productive technology are larger.
To characterize the general trade-off between inefficient exclusion from trade/innovation
and expropriation guiding property rights selection, I study both the possibly consensual ex-
change of economic value between its original owner and a potential buyer and a downstream
firm’s choice of whether to produce in-house through an old technology or to adopt a new
one necessitating an upstream firm’s input. In the former case, fully protecting the original
owners’ property implies that some high-valuation potential buyers inefficiently refuse to buy
it because of transaction costs. When instead property rights are weak, low-valuation po-
tential buyers inefficiently expropriate the original owners’ property. The trade-off between
these two misallocations entails that the strength of property rights, and thus the size of
the market, will be more limited the larger transaction costs are regardless of whether they
are driven by frictions outside the control of traders/innovators or determined by the mix of
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the dispersion in traders’ valuations and either the original owners’ market power or their
privileged information. A similar conclusion holds true for the upstream firm’s property
rights on his input. Being the relative cost random and ex ante non contractible, a strong
protection of the upstream firms’ property discourages the downstream firms from innovat-
ing because of the risk of being held-up. When instead the upstream firms are only weakly
protected, low-productivity downstream firms inefficiently exploit the input. Balancing these
two misallocations entails that the protection of the upstream firms’ property rights (size
of the market) will be weaker (larger) the greater incomplete contracting costs are, i.e., the
higher is the probability of low-cost realization. Crucially, these implications survive when a
group of traders/innovators has a larger political influence on institutional design and when
the disincentive to effort effect of weak property rights is taken into account.
To evaluate the central model predictions, I focus on a panel of 135 countries spanning
the 2006-2015 period. OLS estimates suggest that the protection of the original owners’
(downstream firms’) property rights is the weakest (strongest) where market frictions—i.e.,
excessive regulation and financial inefficiencies—and failures—i.e., lack of the competitive-
ness of corporate activity and lemons-type distortions (incomplete contracting costs due to
asset specificities)—are the largest. To determine if these relationships are indeed causal,
I pursue three strategies. First, I control not only for country and year fixed effects, but
also for the development level, the inclusiveness of political institutions, the strength of state
capacity, internal conflicts, and the level of human capital. Considering these observables
together leaves the results almost intact. Second, I calculate that the influence of unob-
servables would have to be on average sixty times greater than that of all observables to
explain away the negative links between property rights and transaction costs. Finally, I
use as excluded instruments proxies for both the availability of the latest technologies and
the quality of math and science education. Conditional on all observables, the 2SLS esti-
mates are strongly consistent with the OLS ones. In addition, the validity of the exclusion
restriction is vindicated by the canonical under-identification and over-identification tests.
I close by highlighting how two central results of my analysis open key avenues for future
research. First, the tendency of property rights toward optimality does not imply that the
existing legal variation is irrelevant and thus does not warrant reforms. On the contrary,
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the model reveals that special interests can distort the design of property rights away from
optimality when the political process is less than perfect. Second, weak property rights are
society’s response to the existence of sizable transaction costs, which in turn are driven by
the dispersion in the traders’ valuations and the likelihood of a more productive technology,
and therefore their negative correlation with economic outcomes might be—at least partly—
spurious. As a consequence, further research on the relationships among endogenous property
rights, endogenous transaction costs, and economic outcomes is needed.
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Appendix
Property Rights and Market Power
The first-order condition of society’s problem is − λˆ−λ
2l
(
λˆ+ λ− 2v
)
= 0, whose left-hand
side is the infra-marginal effect of a rise in γ. The latter can be negative only for v < λm. 
Property Rights and Lemons-type Distortions
The high-valuation potential buyers’ expected payoff from buying θ pL
2
− pL is weakly
greater than her expected payoff from expropriation (1− γ) θ pL
2
for γ∗ higher than 2
θ
<
1 being θ > 2. The middle(low)-valuation potential buyers instead do not buy because
αpL
2
−pL(pL2θ −pL) < 0. For γ∗ ≤ 2θ , the derivative of society’s objective function with respect
to γ is −
[
(1−∆) (α− 1) + (θ−1)2
θ
∆
2
]
λm, which is negative. For γ
∗ > 2
θ
instead, it equals
− [(1−∆) (α− 1)− θ−1
θ
∆
2
]
λm, which falls with α, rises with ∆, is negative for ∆→ 0, and
positive for ∆→ 1. γ∗ possibly jumps from 0 to 1 for α (∆) sufficiently small (large). 
Considering a Generic Probability Density Function of the Potential Buyers’ Valuation
In the case of exogenous transaction costs, potential buyers value x at λ ∈ [λ, λ] dis-
tributed according to the log-concave probability density function f with cumulative distri-
bution function F . Then, γ∗ maximizes
∫ λ
λˆ
(λ− α) dF (λ) + ∫ λˆ
λ
[(1− γ)λ+ γv] dF (λ) for
λˆ < λ and W FE otherwise. For λˆ < λ, γ∗ > 0 is defined by 1−γ
∗
γ∗ vλˆf
(
λˆ
)
−
(
λˆ− v
)
F
(
λˆ
)
+∫ λˆ
λ
F (λ) dλ = 0 and society’s objective function is sub-modular in γ and α when
f ′(λˆ)
f(λˆ)
<
α
v(v+α)
γ∗
1−γ∗ . While the right-hand side of this inequality is greater than
α
v(λ−v−α) , its left-hand
side is lower than f
′
f
(v + α) since log-concavity of f implies a decreasing f
′
f
(Dharmadhikari
and Joag-Dev, 1988). Hence, the inequality is true and thus dγ
∗
dα
≤ 0 for f ′
f
(v + α) < α
v(λ−v−α)
or equally if v is sufficiently large (see section 3.1 for the corresponding restriction in the basic
setup). To understand this last remark, notice that the right-hand side of the sufficient condi-
tion increases with v for 2v > λ−α, whereas its left-hand side is negative for v+α larger than
the mode of λ, being every log-concave density function defined on a real support unimodal
(Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev, 1988). For λˆ < λ, the infra-marginal effect of a rise in γ is[
v − E
(
λ|λ ≤ λˆ
)]
F
(
λˆ
)
, which can be negative only if v < λm = E (λ) ≥ E
(
λ|λ ≤ λˆ
)
.
For λˆ < λ and v ≥ λm therefore, γ∗ = 1. For λˆ < λ and v < λm instead, γ∗ can jump from
0 to the interior solution whenever
∫ λ
λˆ
(λ− α) dF (λ) + ∫ λˆ
λ
[(1− γ∗)λ+ γ∗v] dF (λ) > λm.
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This last condition is more difficult to satisfy the larger the transaction costs are since the
derivative of its left-hand side with respect to α equals −1−γ∗
γ∗ vf
(
λˆ
)
− F (λ)+ F (λˆ) < 0.
Next, I show that the results produced by the other setups survive to considering any f .
When the original owners have market power, two observations are key. First, the mark-
up α∗ maximizes now the original owners’ expected payoff
∫ λ
λˆ
(v + α) dF (λ) +
∫ λˆ
λ
γ∗vdF (λ),
whose derivative with respect to α is 1 − F
(
λˆ
)
−
(
λˆ− v
)
f
(
λˆ
)
. Hence, dα
∗
dγ
= λˆ and
thus dλˆ
dγ
=
(
dα∗
dγ
γ − v − α∗
)
1
γ2
= 0. Again, the effect of a rise in the strength of optimal
property rights on society’s objective function
∫ λ
λˆ
λdF (λ)+
∫ λˆ
λ
[(1− γ)λ+ γv] dF (λ) equals
− λˆ−λ
2
(
λˆ+ λ− 2v
)
f
(
λˆ
)
, which is negative for v+α
∗
γ∗ + λ − 2v > 0 and positive otherwise.
As in the baseline case of a uniform distribution f , γ∗ jumps from 0 to 1 as α∗, which is
either 0 or its maximum value α = min
{
v, λ− v}, becomes sufficiently small.
Turning to the scenario of transaction costs driven by lemon-type distortions, it follows
from society’s objective function that only the mean of the potential buyers’ valuation dis-
tribution λm matters. This remark highlights the full generality of the analysis.
For what finally concerns the case of transaction costs determined by incomplete con-
tracting inefficiencies, society maximizes α
∫ λ
λˆ
(λ− v) dF (λ) + (1− α) ∫ λ
λˆ
(δλ− v) dF (λ) +∫ λˆ
λ
δλdF (λ), which strictly increases with γ when −dλˆ
dγ
[
αλˆ+ (1− α) δλˆ− v − δλˆ
]
f
(
λˆ
)
=
− v2(α−1+γ)
(1−δ)(1−γ)3f
(
λˆ
)
> 0 or if γ < 1 − α and weakly decreases otherwise. Hence, the unique
and global solution is γ∗ = 1−α as in the baseline scenario of a uniform distribution f . 
The Political Economy of Property Rights Protection
In the case of exogenous transaction costs and excluded low-valuation potential buyers,
the derivative of the objective function is v
2−α2
(γ∗)2 + (λ+ )
2− 2vλ = 0 for λˆ < λ and v−λm +
2λ+2
2l
otherwise, the infra-marginal effect of a rise in γ for λˆ < λ is −(λˆ−λ−)(λˆ+λ+−2v)
2l
+ 2v
2l
,
and the second-order conditions are as in the basic setup. Thus, γ∗ is set inefficiently high,
falls with α provided that (λ+ )2−2vλ < 0 or  not too large, and possibly jumps from 0 to
the interior solution for α sufficiently small under the same condition discussed in the basic
setup. When instead to be excluded are high-valuation potential buyers, society maximizes
the objective function
∫ λ−
λˆ
λ−α
l
dλ+
∫ λˆ
λ
(1−γ)λ+γv
l
dλ for λˆ < λ and W FE − (1− γ) 2λ−2
2l
oth-
erwise. Both the infra-marginal effect of a rise in γ and the first and second-order conditions
for a positive solution are as in the baseline analysis, whereas for λˆ ≥ λ the first-order con-
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dition is v−λm + 2λ−22l and thus leads again to an inefficiently large γ∗. The condition such
that γ∗ possibly jumps from 0 to the positive solution is easier to satisfy the smaller α is for
α < γ∗
(
λ− v − ) and thus under the basic model restrictions on α for  small.
When original owners have market power, the only relevant case is λ < λˆ and society max-
imizes
∫ λ
λˆ
λ
l
dλ+
∫ λˆ
λ+
(1−γ)λ+γv
l
dλ, whose derivative with respect to γ is −(λˆ−λ−)(λˆ+λ+−2v)
2l
+
2v
2l
. Hence, equilibrium property rights jump from 0 to 1 for α∗ and  sufficiently small.
Turning to the case of transaction costs driven by lemon-type distortions and low(high)-
valuation potential buyers not participating in the institutional design, society’s objec-
tive function is that of the basic setup with (1− γ) λm
θ
(
∆
2
− ) in place of (1− γ) λm
θ
∆
2
((1− γ) θλm
(
∆
2
− ) in place of (1− γ) θλm∆2 for γ∗ ≤ 2θ and θλm (∆2 − ) in place of
θλm
∆
2
otherwise). While for γ∗ ≤ 2
θ
the first-order condition of society’s problem equals
−
[
(1−∆) (α− 1) + (θ−1)2
θ
∆
2
− 
θ
]
λm (−
[
(1−∆) (α− 1) + (θ−1)2
θ
∆
2
− θ
]
λm) and so it is
negative for  not too large, for γ∗ > 2
θ
it equals − [(1−∆) (α− 1)− θ−1
θ
∆
2
− 
θ
]
λm and
thus is negative for ∆ and  small and α large (the baseline case analysis applies).
For what finally concerns the case of transaction costs determined by incomplete con-
tracting inefficiencies, the equilibrium is the same whether or not a sufficiently small group
of either high- or low-λ downstream firms is kept out of the institutional design.
Crucially, the political economy case can be generalized to the consideration of generic
distributions of λ and/or the inclusion of production and investment activities. 
Production
In the case of exogenous transaction costs, the original owners’ expected utility equals
v(λ−λˆ)
l
+
γ∗v(λˆ−λ)
l
− κ and thus γ˜ is implicitly defined by v[λ−(v+α)γ˜
−1]
l
+
γ˜v[(v+α)γ˜−1−λ]
l
= κ,
whose left-hand side rises with γ˜ because −dλˆ
dγ˜
v
l
(1− γ˜) + v(λˆ−λ)
l
= vλˆ
γ˜l
(1− γ˜) + v(λˆ−λ)
l
≥
0. Thus, production realizes for γ∗ ≥ γ˜. When the original owners have market power,
their expected utility is
(v+α∗)(λ−λˆ)
l
+
γ∗v(λˆ−λ)
l
− κ, and γ˜ is defined by (v+α
∗)[λ−(v+α∗)γ˜−1]
l
+
γ˜v[(v+α∗)γ˜−1−λ]
l
= κ, whose left-hand side rises with γ˜ because −dλˆ
dγ˜
v(1−γ˜)+α∗
l
+
v(λˆ−λ)
l
=
λˆ
γ˜l
[v (1− γ˜) + α∗]+ v(λˆ−λ)
l
≥ 0 and rises with α if − dλˆ
dα
v(1−γ˜)+α∗
l
+ λ−λˆ
l
= −v(1−γ˜)+α∗
γ˜l
+ λ−λˆ
l
≥ 0
or for λ large and v not too small compared to α∗ and so γ∗ → 1. Hence, production realizes
for γ∗ ≥ γ˜, and dγ˜
dα
≤ 0. For what finally concerns the scenario of transaction costs driven
by lemon-type distortions, the original owners’ expected utility is ∆
2
pL +
(
1− ∆
2
)
γ∗λm − κ
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and γ˜ is independent of α being equal to 2κ−∆pL
(2−∆)λm . Once again, x is produced if γ
∗ ≥ γ˜. 
Investment
With exogenous transaction costs, potential buyers buy if λ (1 + ρ) − v (1 + ρ) − α ≥
(1− γI)λ or λ ≥ λˆI ≡ v+α(1+ρ)
−1
γI
and thus society’s objective function is
∫ λ
λˆI
λ(1+ρ)−α
l
dλ +
(1 + ρ)
∫ λˆI
λ
(1−γ)λ+γv
l
dλ, γ∗I =
v2−( α1+ρ)
2
λ(2v−λ) , and the original owners’ expected payoff from in-
vestment equals v (1 + ρ)
(λ−λˆI)
l
+ γ∗I v (1 + ρ)
λˆI−λ
l
− ζ, whose derivative with respect to γ∗I
is −dλˆI
dγ∗I
v (1 + ρ)
(1−γ∗I )
l
+ v (1 + ρ) λˆI−λ
l
≥ 0. For γ∗I > γ˜I , society picks γ∗I if the social
welfare is larger at γ∗I with investment than it is at γ
∗ without or whenever the inequality∫ λ
λˆI
λ(1+ρ)−α
l
dλ− ∫ λ
λˆ
λ−α
l
dλ+ (1 + ρ)
∫ λˆI
λ
(1−γ∗I )λ+γ∗I v
l
dλ− ∫ λˆ
λ
(1−γ∗)λ+γ∗v
l
dλ− ζ ≥ 0 holds. The
left hand side of this condition is larger than (1 + ρ)
(
γ∗λˆ2 − γ∗I λˆ2I
)
+ (γ∗I − γ∗)λ2 (1 + ρ) +
2v
[
(1 + ρ) γ∗I
(
λˆI − λ
)
− γ∗
(
λˆ− λ
)]
−2α
(
λˆ− λˆI
)
− ζl, which is positive for α sufficiently
small compared to v and so γ∗I → γ∗ and for ρ (ζ) not too small (large). A similar analysis
applies to the γ∗I ≤ γ˜I scenario when society chooses γ˜I and not γ∗ if the social welfare is
larger at γ˜I with investment than it is at γ
∗ without investment. In the former case, λˆI is
evaluated at γ˜I . If v ≥ λm finally, then γ∗ = 1 and investment is certain.
When the original owners have market power, their expected utility rises with and falls
with α if − dλˆ
dα
v(1−γ˜I)(1+ρ)+α∗
l
+ λ−λˆ
l
= −v(1−γ˜I)+α∗
γ˜I(1+ρ)l
+ λ−λˆ
l
≥ 0 or if v is not too small compared
to α∗ since then γ∗ → 1. Hence, γ˜I falls with α when the mark-up is sufficiently small
compared to v and society selects γˆI if investment is welfare enhancing. For γ
∗ > γ˜I , this
is the case if ρ
∫ λ
λˆ
λ
l
dλ + ρ
∫ λˆ
λ
(1−γ∗)λ+γ∗v
l
dλ − ζ ≥ 0 and therefore for ρ (ζ) not too small
(large). For γ∗ ≤ γ˜I instead, the analysis is as in the exogenous transaction costs case and
γ˜I is selected for α small compared to v and so γ
∗
I → γ∗ and for ρ (ζ) not too small (large).
For what finally concerns the scenario of transaction costs driven by lemon-type distor-
tions, the original owners’ expected utility is ∆
2
pL (1 + ρ) +
(
1− ∆
2
)
γ∗λm (1 + ρ) − κ, and
γ˜I =
2κ−∆pL(1+ρ)
(2−∆)λm(1+ρ) , and γ
∗
I is as in the basic setup. Investment prevails only if optimal property
rights are larger than γ˜I , and society then selects γˆI if investment is welfare enhancing. For
γ∗ > γ˜I , this is the case if θλm∆2 +(1−∆) [(1− γ∗)αλm + γ∗λm]+
[
(1− γ∗) λm
θ
+ γ∗λm
]
∆
2
≥
ζρ−1 and so for ρ (ζ) not too small (large). For γ∗ ≤ γ˜I instead, society selects γ˜I if
ρθλm
∆
2
+ [(1 + ρ) (1− γ˜I)− (1− γ∗)]
[
(1−∆)αλm + λmθ ∆2
]
+
(
1− ∆
2
)
(γ˜I − γ∗)λm − ζ ≥ 0
and so for α small relative to v and so γ∗I → γ∗ and for ρ (ζ) not too small (large). 
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Full Sample
Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia;
Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d’Ivoire;
Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon;
Gambia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Honduras: Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan;
Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia; Mada-
gascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia;
Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal;
Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain;
Sri Lanka; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad & Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey;
Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
Table 2: Summary of Variables
Variable Definition and Sources Statistics
Property-Rights:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging the strength of generic property 4.388
rights. Source: 2006-2015 EOS, available at https://www.weforum.org/reports/ (1.034)
Property
Intellectual-Property:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging how strong are intellectual 3.713
rights: property rights. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (1.124)
Shareholders-Protection:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging to what extent are the interests 4.305
of minority shareholders protected by the legal system. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.750)
Over-Regulation:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging how burdensome is for firms to 3.708
comply with governmental administrative requirements. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.658)
Unavailability-Financing:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging the financial sector difficulties 2.489
in providing products and services to businesses. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.955)
Market-Dominance:
Index ranging between one and seven and falling with the competitiveness of 3.168
Transaction corporate activity. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.837)
costs:
Trade-Barriers:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging how much non-tariff barriers curb 2.545
imported goods ability to compete with domestic ones. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.685)
Asymmetric-Information:
Index ranging between one and seven and falling with the extent of information used 3.447
by buyers to make purchasing decisions. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.835)
Asset-Specificities:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging the competitive advantage of the 3.595
country’s companies in international markets. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (1.015)
Income:
Natural logarithm of the output-side real GDP at chained PPPs in 2011 US dollar 9.213
per capita. Source: Penn World Table 9.0, available at https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/ (1.194)
Democracy:
Polity IV constraints on the executive authority score ranging between one and 5.303
seven. Source: POLITY IV dataset, available at http://www.systemicpeace.org (1.875)
Reserves:
Crude oil proved reserves in barrels per capita. Source: Energy Information 1895.327
Other Administration, available at http://www.eia.gov/ (9400.035)
controls:
Conflict-External:
Share of previous half-century in which the country was involved in external 0.014
military conflicts. Source: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (0.050)
Conflict-Internal:
Share of previous half-century in which the country was involved in internal 0.064
military conflicts. Source: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (0.120)
Human-Capital:
Ratio of total tertiary enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the relative 33.758
age group. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (25.843)
Technology-Availability:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging the availability of the latest 4.634
Excluded technologies. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (1.033)
instruments:
Math-Science:
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging the quality of math and science 3.943
education. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.975)
Note: 1. The last column reports the mean value and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of each variable. Both are computed for the
1350 observations used in tables 2 to 6.
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Figure 1: Strength of Property Rights Protection
Note: 1. Here, I divide the range of each of the four variables, whose definitions and sources are listed in table 2, into four equal intervals.
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Figure 2: Property Rights and Financial Inefficiencies
Note: 1. Residuals and fitted values lines are obtained from the sample employed in table 3.
Figure 3: Property Rights and Market Power
Note: 1. Residuals and fitted values lines are obtained from the sample employed in table 3.
Figure 4: Property Rights and Lemons-type Distortions
Note: 1. Residuals and fitted values lines are obtained from the sample employed in table 3.
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Figure 5: Downstream Firm’s Property Rights and Incomplete Contracting Costs
Note: 1. Residuals and fitted values lines are obtained from the sample employed in table 3.
Figure 6: Property Rights and Transaction Costs
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Table 3: Property Rights and Transaction Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The dependent variable is Property-Rights
Over-Regulation - 0.445
(0.049)***
Unavailability-Financing - 0.190
(0.078)**
Market-Dominance - 0.370
(0.061)***
Trade-Barriers - 0.238
(0.047)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.314
(0.044)***
Asset-Specificities 0.290
(0.059)***
Estimation OLS
R2 0.40 0.28 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.29
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel B. The dependent variable is Intellectual-Property
Over-Regulation - 0.495
(0.063)***
Unavailability-Financing - 0.161
(0.080)**
Market-Dominance - 0.470
(0.065)***
Trade-Barriers - 0.181
(0.054)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.425
(0.053)***
Asset-Specificities 0.492
(0.078)***
Estimation OLS
R2 0.24 0.06 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.18
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel C. The dependent variable is Shareholders-Protection
Over-Regulation - 0.337
(0.060)***
Unavailability-Financing - 0.243
(0.102)**
Market-Dominance - 0.356
(0.067)***
Trade-Barriers - 0.329
(0.052)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.317
(0.056)***
Asset-Specificities 0.367
(0.071)***
Estimation OLS
R2 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.24
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by country in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications include country and year fixed effects.
Table 4: Property Rights and Transaction Costs — Controlling for Observables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The dependent variable is Property-Rights
Over-Regulation - 0.442
(0.049)***
Unavailability-Financing - 0.202
(0.071)***
Market-Dominance - 0.357
(0.061)***
Trade-Barriers - 0.226
(0.049)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.307
(0.048)***
Asset-Specificities 0.272
(0.058)***
P-value for all extra controls 0.08 0.07 0.33 0.31 0.56 0.27
Estimation OLS
R2 0.42 0.31 0.38 0.32 0.37 0.31
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel B. The dependent variable is Intellectual-Property
Over-Regulation - 0.482
(0.063)***
Unavailability-Financing - 0.163
(0.077)**
Market-Dominance - 0.460
(0.065)***
Trade-Barriers - 0.174
(0.055)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.414
(0.055)***
Asset-Specificities 0.469
(0.078)***
P-value for all extra controls 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.56 0.17
Estimation OLS
R2 0.26 0.10 0.28 0.11 0.26 0.20
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel C. The dependent variable is Shareholders-Protection
Over-Regulation - 0.340
(0.059)***
Unavailability-Financing - 0.268
(0.108)**
Market-Dominance - 0.357
(0.063)***
Trade-Barriers - 0.340
(0.053)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.329
(0.055)***
Asset-Specificities 0.352
(0.068)***
P-value for all extra controls 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.11
Estimation OLS
R2 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.25
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by country in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications include country and year fixed effects, Income, Democracy, Reserves, Conflict-External, Conflict-Internal, and Human-Capital.
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Table 5: Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables
(1) (2) (3)
The dependent variable is
Property-Rights Intellectual-Property Shareholders-Protection
The measure of transaction cost is:
Over-Regulation 147.33 37.08 113.33
Unavailability-Financing 16.83 81.50 10.72
Market-Dominance 27.46 46 357
Trade-Barriers 18.83 24.86 30.91
Asymmetric-Information 43.86 37.64 27.42
Asset-Specificities 15.11 20.39 23.47
Note: 1. Each cell reports an index constructed as explained in section 4.1.2 and based on the coefficients attached to the measure of
transaction costs listed on the left and obtained from two regressions. In one, the covariates include only country and year
fixed effects. In the other, the “full set” of covariates gathers country and year fixed effects, Income, Democracy, Reserves,
Conflict-External, Conflict-Internal, and Human-Capital. The number of observations is 1350.
Table 6: Property Rights and Endogenous Transaction Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The dependent variable is Property-Rights
Over-Regulation - 0.945
(0.166)***
Unavailability-Financing - 1.625
(0.396)***
Market-Dominance - 0.219
(0.047)***
Trade-Barriers - 1.185
(0.271)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.776
(0.122)***
Asset-Specificities 2.043
(0.647)***
P-value for all extra controls 0.00 0.17 0.67 0.35 0.18 0.79
First Stage for the Transaction Costs Measure
Technology-Availability - 0.139 - 0.112 - 0.219 - 0.168 - 0.100 0.023
(0.051)*** (0.038)*** (0.047)*** (0.049)*** (0.055)* (0.034)
Math-Science - 0.294 - 0.126 - 0.379 - 0.137 - 0.411 0.162
(0.053)*** (0.057)** (0.058)*** (0.074)* (0.062)*** (0.051)***
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.49 0.15 0.24 0.07 0.65 0.46
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel B. The dependent variable is Intellectual-Property
Over-Regulation - 1.342
(0.206)***
Unavailability-Financing - 2.344
(0.613)***
Market-Dominance - 0.971
(0.103)***
Trade-Barriers - 1.725
(0.403)***
Asymmetric-Information - 1.088
(0.137)***
Asset-Specificities 2.846
(0.774)***
P-value for all extra controls 0.05 0.33 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.67
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
P-value of overidentification test 0.81 0.24 0.37 0.16 0.30 0.23
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel C. The dependent variable is Shareholders-Protection
Over-Regulation - 0.630
(0.163)***
Unavailability-Financing - 1.182
(0.296)***
Market-Dominance - 0.466
(0.108)***
Trade-Barriers - 0.902
(0.232)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.481
(0.128)***
Asset-Specificities 1.217
(0.467)***
P-value for all extra controls 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.62
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
P-value of overidentification test 0.29 0.86 0.41 0.79 0.08 0.05
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by country in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications include country and year fixed effects, Income, Democracy, Reserves, Conflict-External, Conflict-Internal, and Human-Capital. The
endogenous variable in columns (1) to (6) is respectively Over-Regulation, Unavailability-Financing, Market-Dominance, Trade-Barriers, Asymmetric-
Information, and Asset-Specificities, whereas the excluded instruments are Technology-Availability and Math-Science.
3. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor.
4. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is that the excluded instruments, as a group, are exogenous.
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Supplementary Tables
Table I: Summary of Variables
Variable Definition and Sources Statistics
Years needed for adverse possession by any good-faith possessor of a movable good. 9.066
Adverse-Possession: Source: Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero (2017). (10.570)
Property [53]
rights: Index ranging between 1 and 10 and gaging the quality of both conflict of interest 5.101
Investors-Protection regulation and shareholder governance. Source: World Bank, Doing Business Project (1.575)
2006-2015, available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data [1350]
Index ranging between one and seven and rising with the extent to which making 2.902
Bribery: bribes in connection with their daily activities is common for firms. Source: 2006- (1.198)
2015 EOS. [1350]
Index ranging between one and seven and rising with the difficulty to obtain a bank 3.995
Unavailability-Loans: loan with only a good business plan and no collateral. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.874)
[1350]
Index ranging between one and seven and rising with how difficult is it for companies 3.254
Transaction Unavailability-Equity: to raise money by issuing shares on the stock market. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (1.105)
costs: [1350]
Index ranging between one and seven and falling with the intensity of competition 2.165
Market-Power : in the local markets. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. (0.667)
[1350]
Index ranging between one and seven and gaging the extent of production 3.792
Production-Sophistication: sophistication. A value of one (seven) suggests that production uses labor-intensive (1.064)
(sophisticated and knowledge-intensive) processes. Source: 2006-2015 EOS. [1350]
See text. Source: United Nations, Surveys of Crime Trends and the Operations of - 0.007
Enforcement: Criminal Justice Systems 2005-2015, available at https://www.unodc.org/ (1.012)
Other [740]
controls: See text. Sources: European Value Study and World Value Survey available at - 0.0004
Culture: http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ and http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (1.030)
[590]
Note: 1. The last column reports the mean value and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of each variable. Both are computed for
the 1350 observations used in tables III to VI, except in the case of Adverse-Possession for which they are calculated for the 91
observations employed in table II.
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Table II: Property Rights and Endogenous Transaction Costs — Cross-Section
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The dependent variable is Adverse-Possession
Over-Regulation - 14.204
(4.986)***
Unavailability-Financing - 6.370
(3.149)**
Market-Dominance - 11.314
(4.060)***
Trade-Barriers - 11.827
(6.805)*
Asymmetric-Information - 15.717
(6.552)**
Asset-Specificities 8.742
(2.988)***
P-value of underidentification test 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.82 0.19 0.81 0.21 0.82 0.97
P-value of endogeneity test 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.06
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 53 53 53 53 53 53
Panel B. The dependent variable is Property-Rights
Over-Regulation - 1.880
(0.639)***
Unavailability-Financing - 1.135
(0.252)***
Market-Dominance - 1.514
(0.411)***
Trade-Barriers - 2.088
(0.722)***
Asymmetric-Information - 2.108
(0.705)***
Asset-Specificities 1.126
(0.277)***
P-value of underidentification test 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.17 0.32 0.18 0.40 0.14 0.09
P-value of endogeneity test 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 53 53 53 53 53 53
Panel C. The dependent variable is Intellectual-Property
Over-Regulation - 2.297
(0.878)***
Unavailability-Financing - 1.232
(0.265)***
Market-Dominance - 1.841
(0.382)***
Trade-Barriers - 2.273
(0.827)***
Asymmetric-Information - 2.561
(0.717)***
Asset-Specificities 1.392
(0.288)***
P-value of underidentification test 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.57 0.07 0.45 0.18 0.56 0.20
P-value of endogeneity test 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 53 53 53 53 53 53
Panel D. The dependent variable is Shareholders-Protection
Over-Regulation - 1.465
(0.682)**
Unavailability-Financing - 0.959
(0.141)***
Market-Dominance - 1.184
(0.267)***
Trade-Barriers - 1.761
(0.543)***
Asymmetric-Information - 1.650
(0.411)***
Asset-Specificities 0.870
(0.273)***
P-value of underidentification test 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.11 0.45 0.08 0.65 0.03 0.04
P-value of endogeneity test 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.05
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 53 53 53 53 53 53
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications include Income, Democracy, Reserves, Conflict-External, Conflict-Internal, Human-Capital, Enforcement, and Culture. The en-
dogenous variable in columns (1) to (6) is respectively Over-Regulation, Unavailability-Financing, Market-Dominance, Trade-Barriers, Asymmetric-
Information, and Asset-Specificities, whereas the excluded instruments are Technology-Availability and Math-Science.
3. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor.
4. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is that the excluded instruments, as a group, are exogenous.
5. The null hypothesis of the endogeneity test is that the endogenous regressor can be treated as exogenous.
Table III: Investors Protection and Endogenous Transaction Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
The dependent variable is Investors-Protection
Over-Regulation - 0.241
(0.150)*
Unavailability-Financing - 0.469
(0.287)*
Market-Dominance - 0.180
(0.110)*
Trade-Barriers - 0.364
(0.213)*
Asymmetric-Information - 0.178
(0.127)
Asset-Specificities 0.442
(0.344)
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.49 0.75 0.56 0.90 0.33 0.28
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications include country and year fixed effects, Income, Democracy, Reserves, Conflict-External, Conflict-Internal, and Human-Capital. The
endogenous variable in columns (1) to (6) is respectively Over-Regulation, Unavailability-Financing, Market-Dominance, Trade-Barriers, Asymmetric-
Information, and Asset-Specificities, whereas the excluded instruments are Technology-Availability and Math-Science.
3. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor.
4. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is that the excluded instruments, as a group, are exogenous.
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Table IV: Property Rights and Other Measures of Endogenous Transaction Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. The dependent variable is Adverse-Possession
Bribery - 1.427
(0.321)***
Unavailability-Loans - 0.763
(0.141)***
Unavailability-Equity - 0.617
(0.175)***
Market-Power - 0.622
(0.144)***
Production-Sophistication 0.817
(0.127)***
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.60 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.53
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel B. The dependent variable is Intellectual-Property
Bribery - 2.027
(0.454)***
Unavailability-Loans - 1.051
(0.174)***
Unavailability-Equity - 0.802
(0.202)***
Market-Power - 0.937
(0.173)***
Production-Sophistication 1.159
(0.123)***
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.82 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.81
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel C. The dependent variable is Shareholders-Protection
Bribery - 0.953
(0.258)***
Unavailability-Loans - 0.422
(0.135)***
Unavailability-Equity - 0.216
(0.164)
Market-Power - 0.557
(0.154)***
Production-Sophistication 0.543
(0.139)***
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value of overidentification test 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.28
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by country in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications include country and year fixed effects, Income, Democracy, Reserves, Conflict-External, Conflict-Internal, and Human-Capital.
The endogenous variables in columns (1) to (5) is respectively Bribery, Unavailability-Loans, Unavailability-Equity, Market-Power, and Production-
Sophistication, whereas the excluded instruments are Technology-Availability and Math-Science.
3. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor.
4. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is that the excluded instruments, as a group, are exogenous.
Table V: Controlling for the Intermediation Technology
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The dependent variable is Property-Rights
Over-Regulation - 0.906
(0.376)**
Unavailability-Financing - 1.591
(0.454)***
Market-Dominance - 1.013
(0.293)***
Trade-Barriers - 1.340
(0.610)**
Asymmetric-Information - 0.753
(0.307)**
Asset-Specificities - 8.719
(16.529)
P-value of underidentification test 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.86
P-value of overidentification test 0.11 0.29 0.02 0.83 0.06 0.81
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 310 310 310 310 310 310
Panel B. The dependent variable is Intellectual-Property
Over-Regulation - 1.452
(0.401)***
Unavailability-Financing - 2.150
(0.600)***
Market-Dominance - 1.665
(0.417)***
Trade-Barriers - 1.891
(0.780)**
Asymmetric-Information - 1.291
(0.423)***
Asset-Specificities - 14.025
(27.297)
P-value of underidentification test 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.86
P-value of overidentification test 0.26 0.12 0.07 0.68 0.06 0.88
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 310 310 310 310 310 310
Panel C. The dependent variable is Shareholders-Protection
Over-Regulation - 0.620
(0.393)
Unavailability-Financing - 1.681
(0.487)***
Market-Dominance - 0.635
(0.438)
Trade-Barriers - 1.298
(0.479)***
Asymmetric-Information - 0.391
(0.421)
Asset-Specificities - 5.901
(11.821)
P-value of underidentification test 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.86
P-value of overidentification test 0.07 0.93 0.03 0.65 0.04 0.60
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 310 310 310 310 310 310
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by country in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications include country and year fixed effects, Income, Democracy, Reserves, Conflict-External, Conflict-Internal, Human-Capital, Enforce-
ment, and Culture. The endogenous variable in columns (1) to (6) is respectively Over-Regulation, Unavailability-Financing, Market-Dominance,
Trade-Barriers, Asymmetric-Information, and Asset-Specificities, whereas the excluded instruments are Technology-Availability and Math-Science.
3. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor.
4. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is that the excluded instruments, as a group, are exogenous.
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Table VI: Property Rights and Endogenous Transaction Costs — Semi-reduced Forms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. The dependent variable is Property-Rights
Over-Regulation - 1.031
(0.200)***
Unavailability-Financing - 2.403
(1.008)**
Market-Dominance - 0.800
(0.125)***
Trade-Barriers - 2.212
(1.127)**
Asymmetric-Information - 0.738
(0.140)***
Asset-Specificities 1.870
(0.601)***
Technology-Availability - 0.041 - 0.168 - 0.073 - 0.269 0.029 0.059
(0.062) (0.156) (0.064) (0.254) (0.062) (0.075)
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel B. The dependent variable is Intellectual-Property
Over-Regulation - 1.383
(0.253)***
Unavailability-Financing - 3.224
(1.433)**
Market-Dominance - 1.073
(0.161)***
Trade-Barriers - 2.967
(1.669)*
Asymmetric-Information - 0.990
(0.142)***
Asset-Specificities 2.508
(0.707)***
Technology-Availability - 0.020 - 0.190 - 0.062 - 0.326 0.074 0.114
(0.085) (0.210) (0.073) (0.367) (0.067) (0.084)
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel C. The dependent variable is Shareholders-Protection
Over-Regulation - 0.474
(0.219)**
Unavailability-Financing - 1.104
(0.570)**
Market-Dominance - 0.368
(0.160)**
Trade-Barriers - 1.017
(0.520)**
Asymmetric-Information - 0.339
(0.152)**
Asset-Specificities 0.859
(0.417)**
Technology-Availability 0.075 0.017 0.060 - 0.030 0.107 0.121
(0.069) (0.096) (0.072) (0.122) (0.059)* (0.056)**
P-value of underidentification test 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel D. The dependent variable is Property-Rights
Over-Regulation - 0.735
(0.331)**
Unavailability-Financing - 0.909
(0.430)**
Market-Dominance - 0.467
(0.203)**
Trade-Barriers - 0.609
(0.301)**
Asymmetric-Information - 1.024
(0.660)
Asset-Specificities 4.388
(6.399)
Technology-Availability 0.087 0.189 0.126 0.220 - 0.117 - 0.409
(0.115) (0.092)** (0.100) (0.081)*** (0.299) (1.067)
P-value of underidentification test 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.49
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel E. The dependent variable is Intellectual-Property
Over-Regulation - 1.241
(0.470)***
Unavailability-Financing - 1.535
(0.570)***
Market-Dominance - 0.788
(0.213)***
Trade-Barriers - 1.028
(0.399)***
Asymmetric-Information - 1.729
(0.930)*
Asset-Specificities 7.409
(10.093)
Technology-Availability 0.042 0.213 0.108 0.266 - 0.303 - 0.795
(0.166) (0.127)* (0.110) (0.127)** (0.414) (1.707)
P-value of underidentification test 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.49
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Panel F. The dependent variable is Shareholders-Protection
Over-Regulation - 1.012
(0.453)**
Unavailability-Financing - 1.253
(0.470)***
Market-Dominance - 0.643
(0.249)***
Trade-Barriers - 0.838
(0.338)**
Asymmetric-Information - 1.410
(0.813)*
Asset-Specificities 6.045
(8.391)
Technology-Availability - 0.158 - 0.019 - 0.105 0.024 - 0.440 - 0.841
(0.169) (0.112) (0.129) (0.091) (0.365) (1.395)
P-value of underidentification test 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.49
Estimation 2SLS
Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by country in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%.
2. All specifications include country and year fixed effects, Income, Democracy, Reserves, Conflict-External, Conflict-Internal, and Human-Capital. The
endogenous variables in columns (1) to (6) is respectively Over-Regulation, Unavailability-Financing, Market-Dominance, Trade-Barriers, Asymmetric-
Information, and Asset-Specificities, whereas the excluded instruments are Math-Science in panels A to C and Technology-Availability otherwise.
3. The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor.
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